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 Dancing in the Dark: 
Of Provinces and Section 35 Rights 
After 2010 
Kerry Wilkins* 
I. THE ANTINOMY1 
The bad news is that we still do not know all that we really need to 
know about provincial capacity and the rights recognized and affirmed in 
section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.2 
1. The One Hand 
On the one hand, the Supreme Court has told us that “[t]he text and 
purpose of s. 35(1) do not distinguish between federal and provincial 
laws which restrict aboriginal or treaty rights, and they should both be 
subject to the same standard of constitutional scrutiny”3 and, on several 
occasions now, that justified provincial interference with Aboriginal 
rights, at least, is constitutionally permissible.4 In none of these decisions 
                                                                                                             
*  Of the Ontario Bar. These are, of course, personal views, not necessarily those of any of 
my clients or employers, past, present or future. Special thanks to Ben Berger and to the indefatiga-
ble Kent McNeil, whose careful review of an earlier draft resulted, as usual, in very helpful 
suggestions for improvement, and to Kristina Gill and Hue Nguyen, whose research assistance on a 
different project proved very fruitful for this one. 
1  Thanks to Dwight Newman for reminding me of this perfectly apposite word. 
2  Being Schedule B of the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.) 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Constitution 
Act, 1982”]. 
3  R. v. Côté, [1996] S.C.J. No. 93, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139, at para. 74 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Côté”]. Compare Paul v. British Columbia (Forest Appeals Commission), [2003] S.C.J. No. 34, 
2003 SCC 55, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 585, at para. 24 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Paul”] (“Section 35 … applies 
to both [the] provinces and the federal government”). 
4  See Côté, id., at para. 74; Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108, 
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, at para. 160 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Delgamuukw”]; Paul, id., at paras. 24-25. It 
is interesting to observe in each case how the Court arrived at this conclusion. In Côté, id., the Court 
relied on R. v. Badger, [1996] S.C.J. No. 39, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Badger”] for 
support. Badger is indeed a case about a provincial law, and does say (at para. 85, as the Court in 
Côté correctly notes) that infringement of the relevant rights must be justified. But Badger, first, is a 
case about a treaty right, not an Aboriginal right, and second, is a case that turns crucially on the 
special constitutional powers conferred on the province of Alberta by para. 12 of the Alberta Natural 
530 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
was it necessary for the Court to pronounce upon this issue,5 but sooner 
or later, other things equal, by dint of repetition alone, this dictum could 
become the law. In the single case to date in which the Court did find a 
provincial law to infringe an Aboriginal right,6 the Court proceeded in a 
manner consistent with this understanding of things.7 Conclusions in 
other decisions also support, or at least bespeak, this general view. In 
Delgamuukw,8 the Court, when listing legislative objectives sufficient to 
anchor justified infringements of Aboriginal title, included among them 
several that lie well within provincial legislative authority.9 And in 
Haida,10 the Court left no doubt that the provincial, as well as the federal 
Crown, must consult with relevant Aboriginal communities before 
engaging in conduct that might adversely affect credibly claimed Abo-
riginal rights.11 This conclusion, at a minimum, makes a good deal more 
sense if one accepts that provinces have at least some constitutional 
capacity to affect such rights adversely. Finally, a rule that allowed for 
justified provincial infringement of treaty and Aboriginal rights would 
have certain evident practical advantages. One is simplicity: everyone 
would know at a glance exactly what the game was and be able to 
proceed accordingly. Another is that such a dispensation would make it 
safer for courts to be generous about accrediting claims of treaty or 
                                                                                                             
Resources Transfer Agreement, 1930 (“NRTA”), Schedule 2 to the Constitution Act, 1930 (U.K.), 
20-21 Geo. V, c. 26, and s. 1 of the Constitution Act, 1930: see Badger, at para. 47. But for that 
special authority, the analysis and outcome in Badger might well have been different: see Badger, at 
para. 69. Delgamuukw, id., in turn, relied entirely on Côté as support for this proposition. And the 
Court in Paul relied (at para. 25) on R. v. Sparrow, [1990] S.C.J. No. 49, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sparrow”], “for the proposition that government regulation, including 
provincial regulation, may, by legislation, infringe an aboriginal right if that infringement is 
justified”. But Sparrow is a case concerned exclusively with federal, not provincial, regulation of an 
Aboriginal right and did not consider, nor need to consider, the relationship between provincial 
legislation and Aboriginal rights. 
5  In Côté, id., the Court concluded (at para. 77) that the only relevant provincial regulation 
did not infringe the relevant Aboriginal right; in Delgamuukw, id., the Court concluded (at paras. 73-
108) that it was necessary to send the case back to trial to ascertain whether the Aboriginal right at 
issue — Aboriginal title, in that instance — existed; and in Paul, id., the issue before the Court was 
not whether any provincial legislation infringed the appellant’s Aboriginal rights. 
6  R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray, [2006] S.C.J. No. 54, 2006 SCC 54, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 686 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sappier”]. 
7  See id., at para. 55 (the Crown offered no justification for the infringement). Again, 
therefore, it was not necessary for the Court to consider whether justified provincial infringement is 
constitutionally permissible. 
8  Supra, note 4. 
9  Id., at para. 165. 
10  Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] S.C.J. No. 70, 2004 SCC 
73, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Haida”]. 
11  See id., at paras. 57-59. 
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Aboriginal rights. The stakes in such adjudications increase considerably 
if section 35 rights, once acknowledged to be in effect, enjoy what 
amounts to all but absolute immunity from meaningful provincial 
interference.12 
2. The Other Hand 
On the other hand, no one has yet succeeded in identifying a plausi-
ble source of any provincial constitutional capacity to infringe, even in 
justified ways, existing treaty or Aboriginal rights.13 With the arguable 
exception of those in Haida,14 the Supreme Court’s pronouncements on 
section 35 and provincial authority in the cases cited above rely on weak 
judicial authority15 and offer little in the way of supportive legal reason-
ing. This in itself would not be a problem were there not real reason 
elsewhere in Canadian constitutional law to question the provinces’ 
general capacity to infringe, with or without justification, the kinds of 
rights that section 35 now recognizes and affirms.16 But as it happens, 
there is. 
                                                                                                             
12  On this last issue see, e.g., W.I.C. Binnie, “The Sparrow Doctrine: Beginning of the End 
or End of the Beginning?” (1990) 15 Queen’s L.J. 217; Kerry Wilkins, “Judicial Aesthetics and 
Aboriginal Claims”, in Kerry Wilkins, ed., Advancing Aboriginal Claims: Visions; Strategies; 
Directions (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2004), at 300-302; Kerry Wilkins, “R. v. Morris: A Shot 
in the Dark and Its Repercussions” (2008) 7 Indigenous L.J. 1, at 33-35 [hereinafter “Wilkins, 
‘Morris’”]. 
13  By contrast, an obvious source of independent federal authority to infringe s. 35 rights 
and to constrain their exercise is s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, 
reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5 [hereinafter “Constitution Act, 1867”], which confers on the 
federal order of government exclusive authority to make laws about matters relating to “Indians, and 
Lands reserved for the Indians”. This and other “[f]ederal legislative powers continue” despite s. 35 
of the Constitution Act, 1982, subject only to the requirement that Canada justify federal legislation 
and government action that infringes s. 35 rights: Sparrow, supra, note 4, at 1109. 
14  Supra, note 10. 
15  For elaboration, see supra, note 4. 
16  One must speak here of provinces’ general capacity, or lack thereof, to infringe because 
there are specific exceptions to the proposition in the text. According to para. 12 of the Alberta and 
Saskatchewan NRTAs and para. 13 of the Manitoba NRTA, provincial “laws respecting game in 
force ... from time to time” in those provinces “shall apply to the Indians within the boundaries 
thereof”, subject to certain important limits also set out there. By virtue of s. 1 of the Constitution 
Act, 1930, to which these three NRTAs are schedules, these arrangements “shall have the force of 
law notwithstanding anything in the Constitution Act, 1867, or any Act amending the same, or any 
Act of the Parliament of Canada, or in any Order in Council or terms or conditions of union made or 
approved under any such Act as aforesaid”. In other words, provincial game laws in the prairie 
provinces apply, subject to the specified limits, regardless of any restrictions elsewhere in the 
Constitution on provincial legislative authority. 
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The concern emanates from constitutional principles that the courts 
have held to constrain provincial authority before and apart from section 
35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. In Delgamuukw17 the Supreme Court 
held, and in Paul18 it acknowledged, that “the whole range of aboriginal 
rights that are protected by s. 35(1)” of the Constitution Act, 1982 come 
within a core of legislative authority that section 91(24) of the Constitu-
tion Act, 1867 reserves exclusively to the federal order of government.19 
The fact that both decisions also say that justified provincial infringe-
ment of Aboriginal rights is constitutionally permissible20 does not 
contribute to the cause of doctrinal clarity. Supreme Court and other 
jurisprudence have said the same of the rights conferred or preserved in 
Crown treaties with Aboriginal peoples.21 This clearly means that 
provincial laws whose purposes or effects22 suggest advertent attempts to 
extinguish, impair or even relate to any such rights or their exercise are 
constitutionally invalid: without force or effect. According to traditional 
constitutional doctrine, it also means that impairment or extinguishment 
of such rights may not result even inadvertently from the application of 
valid provincial legislation.23 When courts conclude that the relevant 
provincial measure operates inadvertently, through the generality of its 
language, to impair some core federal matter, they read it down, constru-
ing it more narrowly to preclude that inadvertent effect, to preserve its 
constitutional validity.24 This analysis suggests that the provinces do not 
                                                                                                             
17  Supra, note 4. 
18  Supra, note 3. 
19  See Delgamuukw, supra, note 4, at para. 178 (compare at para. 181); Paul, supra, note 3, 
at para. 33. 
20  See supra, note 4, and accompanying text. 
21  See R. v. Morris, [2006] S.C.J. No. 59, 2006 SCC 59, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 915, at para. 43 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Morris”], Deschamps and Abella JJ. (for the majority), at para. 91, McLachlin 
C.J.C. and Fish J. (dissenting); R. v. Simon, [1985] S.C.J. No. 67, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387, at 411 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Simon”]; R. v. Moosehunter, [1981] S.C.J. No. 27, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 282, at 293 
(S.C.C.) (“The Government of Canada can alter the rights of Indians under treaties ... Provinces 
cannot.”); R. v. White and Bob, [1964] B.C.J. No. 212, 50 D.L.R. (2d) 613, at 618 (B.C.C.A.), Davey 
J.A. (for the plurality), affd on related grounds, [1965] S.C.J. No. 80, [1965] S.C.R. vi, 52 D.L.R. 
(2d) 491 (S.C.C.).  
22  See, e.g., Kitkatla Band v. British Columbia (Minister of Small Business, Tourism and 
Culture), [2002] S.C.J. No. 33, 2002 SCC 31, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 146, at paras. 52-54 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Kitkatla”]. 
23  See, e.g., Delgamuukw, supra, note 4, at para. 181 (“s. 91(24) protects a core of federal 
jurisdiction even from provincial laws of general application, through the operation of the doctrine 
of interjurisdictional immunity”) and para. 177 (“s. 91(24) protects a ‘core’ of Indianness from 
provincial intrusion, through the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity”); Paul, supra, note 3, at 
para. 15. 
24  See, e.g., Derrickson v. Derrickson, [1986] S.C.J. No. 16, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 285, at 296 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Derrickson”] (“When otherwise valid provincial legislation, given the 
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now have, and never have had, any power to impair, let alone to extin-
guish, the existing treaty or Aboriginal rights of section 91(24) Indians. 
In 2006, the Supreme Court reached essentially this conclusion in respect 
of Indian treaty rights.25 
In summary, several Supreme Court of Canada decisions have es-
poused or supported the view that provinces may infringe Aboriginal 
rights if they can justify the infringement;26 several Supreme Court of 
Canada decisions — including some of those same decisions27 — have 
held that Aboriginal and treaty rights lie within a core of exclusive 
federal legislative authority and that provincial law may not impair or 
intrude upon such matters, even inadvertently. 
I confess that I have not been able to find a satisfactory way of rec-
onciling these parallel but contending streams of Supreme Court juris-
prudence. I know of three diverse lines of attempt to reconcile them, but 
I find none of them convincing.  
3. Unsuccessful Attempts at Resolution 
Some suggest, first, that all courts need do to resolve this conundrum 
is recognize a distinction between infringement of an existing treaty or 
                                                                                                             
generality of its terms, extends beyond the matter over which the legislature has jurisdiction and over 
a matter of federal exclusive jurisdiction, it must, in order to preserve its constitutionality, be read 
down and given the limited meaning which will confine it within the limits of the provincial 
jurisdiction.”). The Court’s rulings in cases like Derrickson are part of a larger body of case law 
giving effect to the “interjurisdictional immunity” doctrine. The Court’s recent decisions confirm 
that “impairment” of a “core” federal matter is the appropriate test for invoking the interjurisdiction-
al immunity doctrine to read down, or restrict the application of, valid provincial legislation. See 
Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 22, 2007 SCC 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 
48 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Canadian Western Bank”]; Quebec (Attorney General) v. Lacombe, [2010] 
S.C.J. No. 38, 2010 SCC 38, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 453, at para. 66 (S.C.C.); Quebec (Attorney General) v. 
Canadian Owners and Pilots Assn., [2010] S.C.J. No. 39, 2010 SCC 39, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 536, at 
para. 43 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “COPA”] per McLachlin C.J.C. 
25  See Morris, supra, note 21. Strictly speaking., Morris, id., did not close the door alto-
gether on provincial capacity to regulate treaty rights (even apart from the special constitutional 
circumstances that arise from the prairie provinces’ NRTAs: see supra, note 16). Missing, for 
example, from the 1850 treaties that were at issue in Morris were provisions, such as one that 
appears in Treaty No. 8 (see online: <http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/al/hts/tgu/pubs/t8/trty8-
eng.asp#chp4>), subjecting the signatory peoples’ harvesting rights “to such regulations as may  
from time to time be made by the Government of the country, acting under the authority of Her 
Majesty …”. In Badger, supra, note 4, at para. 70, the Supreme Court held that Treaty No. 8, as well 
as the Alberta NRTA, provided that “provincial game laws would be applicable to Indians so long as 
they were aimed at conserving the supply of game”. What regulatory or other powers the provinces 
may derive from treaties themselves require ascertainment case by case, and treaty by treaty. 
26  See supra, notes 3-11, and accompanying text. 
27  See especially supra, notes 3, 4, 8, 19-20 and 23, and accompanying text. 
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Aboriginal right, which triggers the need for justification, and impair-
ment of such a right, which triggers, under traditional doctrine, the more 
absolute protection of interjurisdictional immunity. According to this 
argument, when infringement of one of these rights falls short of im-
pairment, provincial law may have effect as long as the province can 
justify the infringement. 
My principal concern about this proposed solution is (to paraphrase 
Kate Monster from Avenue Q) that there’s a fine, fine line — too fine a 
line for my juridical comfort — between infringement and impairment of 
a treaty or Aboriginal right. According to Morris,28 the most recent 
Supreme Court authority on the meaning of “infringement” in relation to 
section 35 rights, “a prima facie infringement requires a ‘meaningful 
diminution’ of a treaty right. This includes anything but an insignificant 
interference with that right”.29 According to COPA,30 the most recent 
Supreme Court authority on the meaning of “impairment” in the context 
of interjurisdictional immunity, impairment “requires a significant or 
serious intrusion” into the core or exercise of exclusive federal author-
ity.31 Is there a reliably discernible distinction between a “meaningful 
diminution” of a relevant right and a “significant or serious intrusion” 
upon it? My personal inclination is to doubt that courts have developed 
the tools with which to define and preserve, in a range of future cases 
with unpredictable facts, such a subtle distinction. 
But even if I am wrong about this, the distinction serves its intended 
purpose only if “impairment” sets the higher bar of the two: only if, in 
other words, all impairments are infringements but not all infringements 
are impairments. If the Supreme Court’s decision in Morris is any 
indication, however, it appears that the Court, if anything, considers the 
opposite to be true. The majority judgment in Morris, having acknowl-
edged that provincial laws that interfere with treaty rights to hunt are 
constitutionally inapplicable to the bearers of such rights, adds this: 
“[w]here such laws are inapplicable because they impair ‘Indianness’, 
however, they may nonetheless be found to be applicable by incorpora-
tion under s. 88 of the Indian Act.”32 This is so, the Court adds, because 
“[s]ection 88 reflects Parliament’s intention to avoid the effects of the 
                                                                                                             
28  Supra, note 21. 
29  Morris, id., at para. 53, citing with approval (at para. 52) an Aboriginal rights case, R. v. 
Gladstone, [1996] S.C.J. No. 79, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723, at para. 43 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Gladstone”]. 
30  Supra, note 24. 
31  Id., at para. 45. 
32  Morris, supra, note 21, at para. 43. 
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immunity imposed by s. 91(24) by incorporating certain provincial laws 
of general application into federal law.”33 But the legal effect of any 
provincial laws incorporated pursuant to section 88 is “[s]ubject to the 
terms of any treaty.”34 What triggers the statutory protection that section 
88 confers on treaty rights, however, is a prima facie infringement of 
such rights:35 “provincial laws or regulations that place a modest burden 
on a person exercising a treaty right or that interfere in an insignificant 
way with the exercise of that right do not infringe the right”.36 (The 
reasoning of the dissenting judges on these matters is substantially 
similar.)37  
It is important to appreciate what is happening here. The Supreme 
Court, having already established that the provincial law at issue in 
Morris could not apply as such because it impaired the relevant treaty 
right, prescribed a separate, subsequent inquiry to ascertain whether the 
provincial law infringed that same treaty right. This second inquiry, the 
one into infringement, serves no useful purpose unless it is at least 
possible for a provincial law to impair a treaty right without infringing it. 
If all such impairments were also understood to be infringements, the 
Court’s subsequent question about infringement would not need asking: 
it would answer itself. 
A second possible way of seeking to reconcile the tension between 
these two strains of jurisprudence is to suggest that section 35 is itself the 
source of this new provincial authority to infringe the rights it protects. I 
have argued at some length elsewhere38 that this suggestion seems 
unsound, and why: because, in brief, it has no foundation in either the 
text or the legislative history of the Constitution Act, 1982 and conflicts 
with some post-1982 Supreme Court treaty rights jurisprudence. But 
since then, the Supreme Court, in Morris, has expressed itself quite 
clearly on this point: 
Where a prima facie infringement of a treaty right is found, a province 
cannot rely on s. 88 by using the justification test from Sparrow and 
Badger in the context of s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, … The 
purpose of the Sparrow/Badger analysis is to determine whether an 
                                                                                                             
33  Id., at para. 44. 
34  Id.; Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5, s. 88. 
35  Morris, id., at para. 51. 
36  Id., at para. 50. 
37  See id., at paras. 90-100, per McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J. (dissenting on other grounds). 
38  See Kerry Wilkins, “Of Provinces and Section 35 Rights” (1999) 22 Dal. L.J. 185, at 
217-19 [hereinafter “Wilkins, ‘Of Provinces’”]. 
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infringement by a government acting within its constitutionally 
mandated powers can be justified. This justification analysis does not 
alter the division of powers, which is dealt with in s. 88. Therefore, 
while the Sparrow/Badger test for infringement may be useful, the 
framework set out in those cases for determining whether an 
infringement is justified does not offer any guidance for the question at 
issue here.39 
A final40 suggested means of leaving some room for justified provin-
cial infringements of section 35 rights is section 88 of the Indian Act. 
“Section 88,” the Court said in Morris, “reflects Parliament’s intention to 
avoid the effects of the immunity imposed by s. 91(24) by incorporating 
certain provincial laws of general application into federal law.”41 Accord-
ingly, this argument runs, some provincial laws that impair section 35 
rights can govern such rights nonetheless, provided that the impairment 
can be justified. I have written at length about this, too,42 so I will be 
quite brief here.  
First, section 88 does not, and could not, do anything to increase the 
provinces’ constitutional capacity. The most it can do is exactly what the 
Supreme Court has said that it does: adopt into federal law certain 
specified provincial measures and apply those measures as federal law to 
statutory Indians. Once it is established that such laws cannot apply 
because they impair section 35 rights, the task of justifying them falls to 
the federal, not the provincial, order of government. To preserve the 
validity of those provincial laws in their applications to those who are not 
statutory Indians, the courts must presume that the provinces intended 
that these laws be read down so as not to impair the relevant rights. 
Second, we now know from Morris that section 88 itself will screen out 
any provincial laws whose application would result in infringement of a 
treaty right.43 At most, therefore, section 88 can facilitate infringement 
                                                                                                             
39  Morris, supra, note 21, at para. 55 (emphasis added). 
40  To the best of my knowledge. 
41  Morris, supra, note 21, at para. 44. In fact, we know very little about Parliament’s real 
intentions in adding what was then s. 87 to the Indian Act in 1951: see Kerry Wilkins, “Still Crazy 
After All These Years: Section 88 of the Indian Act at Fifty” (2000) 38 Alta. L. Rev. 458 [hereinaf-
ter “Still Crazy”]. But the quotation in the text from Morris captures accurately the meaning and 
function that the courts have ascribed to s. 88. After some considerable early judicial confusion 
about s. 88’s operation, the Supreme Court provided definitive clarification in R. v. Dick, [1985] 
S.C.J. No. 62, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 309, at 326-28 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dick”]. 
42  See Wilkins, “Of Provinces”, supra, note 38, at 219-33; Wilkins, Morris, supra, note 12, at 30-31. 
43  Morris, supra, note 21, at paras. 44-55, per Deschamps and Abella JJ. (for the majority); 
at paras. 95-100, per McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J. (dissenting on other grounds). The majority did 
leave open the possibility that s. 88 could incorporate by reference provincial laws that infringe 
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only of Aboriginal rights,44 and there have been occasional hints of 
judicial doubt about even that.45 Third, section 88, by its terms, applies 
exclusively to “Indians” as defined in the Indian Act,46 not, for example, 
to Inuit or to most Métis. Fourth, although the issue has not yet been 
settled definitively, the prevailing view in the lower courts and among 
the commentators is that the provincial laws that section 88 incorporates 
apply only to “Indians”, not to or in respect of Indians’ lands.47 Fifth, if 
some infringement of an Aboriginal right does occur as a result of section 
88’s intervention, it stands to reason that section 88 itself should be 
called to account in any justification inquiry about that infringement. But 
for section 88, the scheme the provincial law created could not have 
applied in a manner that infringed the right.48 Finally, there is good 
reason to doubt that section 88 could withstand scrutiny in a justification 
inquiry under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, precisely because 
it takes no account of Aboriginal rights. In this respect, it is a statutory 
analogue of the kind of “unstructured discretionary administrative regime 
which risks infringing aboriginal rights in a substantial number of 
applications” with which the Supreme Court found such fault in Adams.49 
The problem, therefore, remains unresolved. Justified provincial in-
fringement of Aboriginal rights (at least) has support in Supreme Court 
                                                                                                             
treaty rights that have a commercial aspect (see id., at para. 46), but the rest of its reasoning on the 
issue leaves little rational basis for such a distinction. 
44  This is possible because the opening words of s. 88, “Subject to the terms of any treaty”, 
carve out no comparable explicit exception for Aboriginal rights. 
45  See, e.g., Badger, supra, note 4, at para. 69 (“Pursuant to the provisions of s. 88 of the 
Indian Act, provincial laws of general application will apply to Indians. This is so except where they 
conflict with aboriginal or treaty rights, in which case the latter must prevail”); Delgamuukw, supra, 
note 4, at para. 183 (“the explicit reference to treaty rights in s. 88 suggests that the provision was 
clearly not intended to undermine aboriginal rights”).  
46  See Indian Act, s. 2(1), definition of “Indian”. But note that s. 88 is one of several Indian 
Act provisions that is subject to the extended definition of “Indian” set out in s. 4.1 of that Act. 
47  For detailed discussion of this issue, see “Still Crazy”, supra, note 41, at 483-97. For a 
notable recent decision taking this position, see Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2007] 
B.C.J. No. 2465, 2007 BCSC 1700, at para. 1039 (B.C.S.C.), citing Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title 
and Section 88 of the Indian Act” (2000) 34 U.B.C. L. Rev. 159; Brian Slattery, “Understanding 
Aboriginal Rights” (1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727, at 779-81. 
48  Courts of Appeal in British Columbia (R. v. Alphonse, [1993] B.C.J. No. 1402, [1993] 5 
W.W.R. 401, at paras. 62-65 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Dick, [1993] B.C.J. No. 1396, [1993] 5 W.W.R. 446, 
at paras. 17-18 (B.C.C.A.)) and Saskatchewan (R. v. Sundown, [1997] S.J. No. 377, [1997] 8 
W.W.R. 379, at para. 61 (Sask. C.A.), affd without reference to the point, [1999] S.C.J. No. 13, 
[1999] 1 S.C.R. 393 (S.C.C.)) have held that the justification inquiry in such situations need look 
only at the infringing provincial measure, not at s. 88, but their reasoning to that conclusion 
overlooks the fact that there could be no infringement but for s. 88. 
49  R. v. Adams, [1996] S.C.J. No. 87, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101, at para. 54 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Adams”]. 
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jurisprudence and has practical advantages, but the task of locating a 
source within Canadian constitutional law for provincial authority to 
infringe such rights, even justifiably, is proving to be unusually vexing. 
And the rule of law requires that provinces not exceed the scope of their 
constitutional authority. 
II. THE ROAD NOT TAKEN AFTER ALL 
For a while, it appeared that the Supreme Court of Canada had 
shown us a pathway out of this predicament. In Canadian Western 
Bank50 in 2007, the Court expressed significant displeasure with the 
constitutional doctrine that gives rise to the problem: interjurisdictional 
immunity. The Court said:  
Canadian federalism is not simply a matter of legalisms. The 
Constitution, though a legal document, serves as a framework for life 
and for political action within a federal state, in which the courts have 
rightly observed the importance of co-operation among government 
actors to ensure that federalism operates flexibly.51  
Viewed against this background, interjurisdictional immunity appeared 
inconsistent with the “dominant tide” of contemporary constitutional 
doctrine,52 which urged the Court to “avoid blocking the application of 
measures which are taken to be enacted in furtherance of the public 
interest” in “the absence of conflicting enactments of the other level of 
government”.53 Inappropriate reliance on interjurisdictional immunity, 
the Court concluded, “would create serious uncertainty”,54 risk creating 
“legal vacuums”, which are, generally speaking, “not desirable”,55 and 
“run … the risk of creating an unintentional centralizing tendency in 
constitutional interpretation … incompatible with the flexibility and co-
ordination required by contemporary Canadian federalism”.56 The Court 
added this: 
                                                                                                             
50  Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 24. 
51  Id., at para. 42. 
52  Id., at paras. 36-37, citing with approval O.P.S.E.U. v. Ontario (Attorney General), 
[1987] S.C.J. No. 48, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2, at 17 (S.C.C.), per Dickson C.J.C. (concurring). 
53  Canadian Western Bank, id., at para. 37. 
54  Id., at para. 43. 
55  Id., at para. 44. 
56  Id., at para. 45. See, to generally similar effect, Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Com-
munity Services Society, [2001] S.C.J. No. 44, 2011 SCC 44, at paras. 61-65 [hereinafter “PHS”]. 
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Finally, the doctrine would seem as a general rule to be superfluous in 
that Parliament can always, if it sees fit to do so, make its legislation 
sufficiently precise to leave those subject to it with no doubt as to the 
residual or incidental application of provincial legislation. …57 
For all these reasons, … we intend now to make it clear that the 
Court does not favour an intensive reliance on the doctrine [of 
interjurisdictional immunity] …58  
Although the doctrine is in principle applicable to all federal and 
provincial heads of legislative authority, the case law demonstrates that 
its natural area of operation is in relation to those heads of legislative 
authority that confer on Parliament power over enumerated federal 
things, people, works or undertakings. …59 
In “the absence of prior case law favouring its application to the sub-
ject matter at hand”, it became permissible, generally speaking, just to 
skip the question of interjurisdictional immunity in division of powers 
analysis.60 
In the result, the appellant bank was unsuccessful in resisting the ap-
plication of Alberta law to its business of promoting to its customers 
certain kinds of insurance. 
Although the Supreme Court was careful to go no farther than to say 
that “interjurisdictional immunity is of limited application and should in 
general be reserved for situations already covered by precedent”61 and to 
acknowledge that “its existence is supported both textually and by the 
principles of federalism”,62 it was terribly tempting to suppose that 
Canadian Western Bank was the beginning of the end for interjurisdic-
tional immunity and that the courts would soon find a way of removing 
that inconvenient impediment altogether from provincial legislative 
authority. Shorn of that obstacle, valid provincial legislation could 
countenance infringement of Aboriginal (and, most probably, treaty) 
rights, as long as the province could justify the infringement: just as the 
Supreme Court keeps saying it can.63 The Court’s constitutional pro-
nouncements on provincial authority seemed to be converging. 
                                                                                                             
57  Canadian Western Bank, id., at para. 46. 
58  Id., at para. 47. 
59  Id., at para. 67. Compare id., at para. 41. 
60  Id., at para. 78. 
61  Id., at para. 77. 
62  Id., at para. 33. 
63  See supra, notes 3-11, and accompanying text. 
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To some of us, this seemed like wishful thinking even then.64 For one 
thing, the Court had said expressly in Canadian Western Bank that 
“Aboriginal lands” were among the “things”, and “Aboriginal peoples” 
among the “persons”, that had come within the traditionally recognized 
purview of interjurisdictional immunity.65 By way of confirmation, it 
added, in its discussion of “The Indian Cases”,66 that “in their federal 
aspect (‘Indianness’), Indian people are governed by federal law exclu-
sively …”67 And the Morris68 and Canadian Western Bank appeals were 
under reserve together at the Supreme Court for several months.69 It is all 
but inconceivable that the Court decided either of these appeals without 
knowing what it was going to say in the other. If the Court’s intention in 
Canadian Western Bank had been to overrule, or even to undercut the 
authority, of a decision it had released just five months earlier, one would 
have expected it to say so very clearly.70 
But worse news, for those who predicted the obsolescence of the in-
terjurisdictional immunity doctrine, came in the COPA decision71 in the 
fall of 2010. In COPA, the Supreme Court held valid Quebec agricultural 
zoning laws to be constitutionally incapable of restricting the placement 
of aerodromes in that province, not because these laws conflicted with 
federal aeronautics law — the Court said they did not72 — but because 
they impaired core federal capacity to determine the locations of aero-
dromes. In reaching that conclusion, the Court, without overruling 
                                                                                                             
64  See, e.g., Wilkins, “Morris”, supra, note 12, at 18-23. 
65  Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 24, at para. 41. Compare PHS, supra, note 56, at 
para. 60. 
66  Canadian Western Bank, id., at paras. 60-61. 
67  Id., at para. 61. 
68  Supra, note 21. 
69  The Supreme Court heard the Morris appeal, id., on October 14, 2005 and released its 
decision on December 21, 2006; it heard Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 24, on April 11, 2006 
and released its decision on May 31, 2007. 
70  On the subject of overruling previous Supreme Court of Canada precedent, see most 
recently Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser, [2011] S.C.J. No. 20, 2011 SCC 20 (S.C.C.). 
According to Rothstein J., dissenting but not on this point: 
in order to overrule its own precedent, the Court must be satisfied, based upon substantial 
reasons, that the precedent was wrongly decided. It is not appropriate simply because of a 
change in the composition of the Court that precedent should be overturned, because of 
the views of newly appointed judges. There must be compelling reasons to justify over-
ruling … 
Id., at para. 130. The majority agreed (id., at paras. 56-57) and added (at para. 59) that the Court 
should not overrule a precedent it has not been asked to overrule: “[a]bsent notice to the profession 
and interested persons, overruling … seems to us procedurally inappropriate.” It appears to follow 
necessarily that Supreme Court of Canada decisions cannot be overruled by implication. 
71  Supra, note 24. 
72  COPA, id., at paras. 62-74. 
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Canadian Western Bank, managed to cast considerable doubt upon the 
critique of interjurisdictional immunity set out in that earlier decision.  
As mentioned above,73 the majority in Canadian Western Bank had 
expressed an intention from then on to confine the application of inter-
jurisdictional immunity to “its natural area of operation” as delineated by 
prior case law: “those heads of legislative authority that confer on 
Parliament power over enumerated federal things, people, works or 
undertakings”.74 But the federal head of power at issue in COPA — the 
power to make laws in relation to aeronautics — does not appear, or 
derive from anything that appears, in the list of enumerated heads of 
federal legislative authority; it derives instead, by inference, from the 
residual federal power over peace, order and good government.75 Who 
knew that federal authority over “the Peace, Order, and Good Govern-
ment of Canada” — that which remains to the federal order after subtrac-
tion of all the classes of subjects assigned exclusively to the provinces76 
— had a core of its own that is capable of resisting incidental impairment 
under the provincial heads of power subtracted from it? Second, it is far 
from clear that power over “aeronautics”, enumerated or not, qualifies as 
a head of “power over … federal things, people, works or undertakings”. 
Aeronautics is not a person or a class of persons, and it is hardly a thing 
or class of things. One could, perhaps, classify it as a “work” or an 
“undertaking” if one were willing to use those terms loosely, but used so 
loosely, these terms could encompass almost any activity, including the 
business of banking: the federally regulated activity held not to attract 
interjurisdictional immunity in Canadian Western Bank. As for prece-
dent, it is true that the Court had held, as early as Johannesson,77 that 
aeronautics regulation is now a matter exclusively for federal regulation 
because of its national dimensions; it held there, as well, that matters 
                                                                                                             
73  See supra, notes 58-60, and accompanying text. 
74  Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 24, at para. 67. 
75  “Because commercial aviation was not foreseen in 1867, aviation is not articulated as a 
head of power under s. 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867. However, it has been held to be a matter of 
national importance and hence supported under the federal [Peace, Order and Good Government] 
power”: COPA, supra, note 24, at para. 28. 
76  The opening words of s. 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867 — the provision conferring 
legislative authority on the federal order in Canada — read, in relevant part, as follows: 
It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate and 
House of Commons, to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and Good Government of Cana-
da, in relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act as-
signed exclusively to the legislatures of the Provinces … 
77  Johannesson v. West Saint Paul (Rural Municipality), [1951] S.C.J. No. 50, [1952] 1 
S.C.R. 292 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Johannesson”]. 
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relating to the placement of aerodromes and airports are essential to the 
exercise of that authority. Never before, however, had the Supreme Court 
protected aeronautical matters from incidental impairment resulting from 
valid provincial law. In Johannesson, for instance, the Court had held 
that the miscreant provincial law was altogether invalid, not that it was 
valid but constitutionally inapplicable. If aeronautics lies within the 
envelope said by precedent to attract the doctrine of interjurisdictional 
immunity, it pushes firmly outward against the outer margins of that 
envelope. This is not what one would expect from a court determined to 
constrain, let alone to attrit, the reach of that immunity. 
There is more. One finds in COPA no mention of, nor concern about, 
what Canadian Western Bank had described as the “dominant tide” of 
contemporary constitutional interpretation:78 a strong preference to leave 
undisturbed, in the absence of proof of conflict between them, the 
operation of laws enacted by both traditional orders of government, in 
the interest of promoting flexible, cooperative federalism.79 If promotion 
of a flexible, cooperative federalism were indeed the principal theme of 
division of powers jurisprudence, one would have expected to see it 
displayed particularly in a case such as COPA, which features legislation 
from Quebec.80 Nowhere in Confederation is there greater attentiveness 
to provincial legislative autonomy. There was, again, no conflict between 
the permissive federal regime that dealt with placement of aerodromes 
and the impugned provincial law, which required approval from a 
provincial commission for any change in the use of designated agricul-
tural lands.81 The reason, the Court said, why the provincial scheme 
could not be allowed to constrain the placement of aerodromes on the 
relevant lands was that, if it did:  
it would force the federal Parliament to choose between accepting that 
the province can forbid the placement of aerodromes on the one hand, 
or specifically legislating to override the provincial law on the other 
hand. This would seriously impair the federal power over aviation, 
effectively forcing the federal Parliament to adopt a different and more 
                                                                                                             
78  See supra, notes 52-53, and accompanying text. 
79  See Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 24, at paras. 36-37, 42-43, 45. 
80  It is interesting that the Court’s two francophone judges from Quebec, LeBel and  
Deschamps JJ., were in dissent in COPA. 
81  COPA, supra, note 24, at paras. 62-74. 
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burdensome scheme for establishing aerodromes than it has in fact 
chosen to do.82 
Put differently, the provincial law cannot apply because its applica-
tion interferes with Parliament’s freedom to legislate, if it chooses, 
permissively,83 or, by implication, to leave the relevant core federal 
matter altogether unregulated.84 Missing altogether from the reasoning in 
COPA are the concerns, expressed so forcefully in Canadian Western 
Bank,85 about the risk of (potentially undesirable) legal vacuums and the 
risk of unintentional centralization of power that were said to attend the 
operation of interjurisdictional immunity.86 Missing too is the supposition 
from Canadian Western Bank that the doctrine of interjurisdictional 
immunity “would seem as a general rule to be superfluous”, because 
Parliament may always achieve its ends by legislating expressly to oust 
the inconvenient provincial regime.87 
Finally, the COPA majority expressly preserves a place in Canadian 
constitutional jurisprudence for interjurisdictional immunity.88  
                                                                                                             
82  Id., at para. 60. Compare id., at para. 48: “Instead of the current permissive regime, Par-
liament would be obliged to legislate for the specific location of particular aerodromes. Such a 
substantial restriction of Parliament’s legislative freedom constitutes an impairment of the federal 
power.” 
83  “Parliament would not be free to introduce broad, permissive legislation, should it so 
choose (and as it has chosen to do) … [T]his … would narrow Parliament’s legislative options and 
impede the exercise of its core jurisdiction”: id., at para. 53. 
84  “In those circumstances where interjurisdictional immunity applies, the doctrine asks 
whether the core of the legislative power has been impaired, not whether or how Parliament has, in 
fact, chosen to exercise that power”: id., at para. 52. 
85  Supra, note 24. 
86  See supra, notes 55-56, and accompanying text. For a similar view, see Bruce Ryder, 
“Equal Autonomy in Canadian Federalism: The Continuing Search for Balance in the Interpretation 
of the Division of Powers” in J. Cameron & B. Ryder, eds. (2011), 54 S.C.L.R. at 565, at 590:  
 Treating a narrowing of Parliament’s legislative options as sufficient to amount to an 
impairment of the exercise of its core jurisdiction, thus requiring the reading down of a 
valid provincial law, turns the reasoning in Canadian Western Bank on its head. One of 
the reasons Binnie and LeBel JJ. gave [in Canadian Western Bank] for restricting the 
interjurisdictional immunity doctrine is that it risks creating undesirable legal vacuums. 
In COPA and Lacombe, the Chief Justice stated that avoiding legal vacuums by permit-
ting valid provincial laws to apply to core federal subject matters is problematic because 
it forces Parliament to legislate if it wishes to overcome or supplement the rules set out in 
provincial law. In other words, the Chief Justice would rather risk legal vacuums than 
risk interference with Parliament’s legislative agenda [footnote omitted]. 
87  See supra, note 57 and accompanying text. Come to that, the Governor General still has 
the constitutional authority, within one year of receiving notice of Royal Assent to a provincial 
statute, to annul it altogether by disallowance: see Constitution Act, 1867, ss. 56, 90. But no one, to 
my knowledge, has ever suggested that this is the only power the Constitution requires to deal with 
provincial laws that are deemed inappropriate. 
88  See COPA, supra, note 24, at para. 58, where the Court dispatches impatiently an argument 
that, in its view “is, at bottom, a challenge to the very existence of the doctrine of interjurisdictional  
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If the COPA decision is any guide, therefore, anticipations of the 
death of interjurisdictional immunity have been, for better or worse, 
exaggerated. What was said to be the “dominant tide” of constitutional 
interpretation89 appears to have ebbed and to have left intact (ashore, as it 
were) the paradox with which we began about provincial authority and 
section 35 rights. The Court has said that the provinces may infringe 
Aboriginal rights, but its rulings on interjurisdictional immunity have 
complicated considerably the task of accounting, in a doctrinally respect-
able way, for the source of that authority. 
III. SIGNS OF DISCOMFORT: NIL/TU,O AND NATIVE CHILD 
The Supreme Court had two other opportunities during 2010 to con-
sider the relationship between valid provincial legislation and life in 
Aboriginal communities. Neither dealt with claims of treaty or Aborigi-
nal right, but both concerned the limits on provincial authority in regard 
to matters of considerable significance to those classified for constitu-
tional purposes as Indians. 
NIL/TU,O90 and Native Child91 were quite similar cases from British 
Columbia and Ontario, respectively. The Court heard and decided them 
together. At issue in both was which order of government, the federal or 
the provincial, had legislative authority to regulate the labour relations of 
provincially-incorporated child and family services societies, staffed 
predominantly by Aboriginal people and partially funded by the federal 
government. Both delivered, with provincial authority and under provin-
cial supervision, specified child protection services primarily, if not 
exclusively, to Aboriginal families: NIL/TU,O on reserve; Native Child 
and Family Services off reserve, in downtown Toronto. The Court in both 
cases concluded unanimously that the labour relations of the two entities 
lay within provincial legislative authority, but divided 6-3 on the reason-
ing to that conclusion. NIL/TU,O is the principal case — Native Child 
                                                                                                             
immunity. Among the reasons for rejecting a challenge to the existence of the doctrine,” the court 
explains, “is that the text of the Constitution Act, 1867, itself refers to exclusivity:... The doctrine of 
interjurisdictional immunity has been criticized but has not been removed from the federalism 
analysis.” 
89  See supra, notes 52-53, and accompanying text. 
90  NIL/TU,O Child and Family Services Society v. B.C. Government and Service Employees’ 
Union, [2010] S.C.J. No. 45, 2010 SCC 45, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 696 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “NIL/TU,O”]. 
91  Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada v. Native Child and Family 
Services of Toronto, [2010] S.C.J. No. 46, 2010 SCC 46, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 737 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Native Child”]. 
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did little more than apply its reasoning — so it is the one that requires the 
closer attention. 
Perhaps the easiest way of understanding the difference between the 
two approaches to the same result in NIL/TU,O is by reference to the 
following passage from Beetz J.’s majority judgment in Four B from 
1980: 
In my view the established principles relevant to this issue can be 
summarized very briefly. With respect to labour relations, exclusive 
provincial legislative competence is the rule, exclusive federal 
competence is the exception. The exception comprises, in the main, 
labour relations in undertakings, services and businesses which, having 
regard to the functional test of the nature of their operations and their 
normal activities, can be characterized as federal undertakings, services 
or businesses: ... [citing authority]. 
There is nothing about the business or operation of Four B which 
might allow it to be considered as a federal business: the sewing of 
uppers on sport shoes is an ordinary industrial activity which clearly 
comes under provincial legislative authority for the purposes of labour 
relations. Neither the ownership of the business by Indian shareholders, 
nor the employment by that business of a majority of Indian employees, 
nor the carrying on of that business on an Indian reserve under a federal 
permit, nor the federal loan and subsidies, taken separately or together, 
can have any effect on the operational nature of that business. By the 
traditional and functional test, therefore, The Labour Relations Act 
applies to the facts of this case, and the Board has jurisdiction. 
... It is argued that the functional test is inappropriate and ought to be 
disregarded where legislative competence is conferred not in terms 
relating to physical objects, things or systems, but to persons or groups 
of persons such as Indians or aliens. 
I cannot agree with these submissions. 
The functional test is a particular method of applying a more general 
rule namely, that exclusive federal jurisdiction over labour relations 
arises only if it can be shown that such jurisdiction forms an integral 
part of primary federal jurisdiction over some other federal object: the 
Stevedoring case. 
Given this general rule, and assuming for the sake of argument that 
the functional test is not conclusive for the purposes of this case, the 
first question which must be answered in order to deal with appellant’s 
submissions is whether the power to regulate the labour relations in 
issue forms an integral part of primary federal jurisdiction over Indians 
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and Lands reserved for the Indians. The second question is whether 
Parliament has occupied the field by the provisions of the Canada 
Labour Code. 
In my opinion, both questions must be answered in the negative.92 
Both judgments in NIL/TU,O agree that the “operations and … nor-
mal activities”93 of the relevant employment enterprise are what needs 
attention in the division of powers analysis.94 The disagreement between 
them is about the relevance to this analysis, as it ought to apply to the 
operations of NIL/TU,O or to those of Native Child, of what lies at the 
core of exclusive federal authority over “Indians” pursuant to section 
91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867. 
The approach of the majority focuses on two portions of the Four B 
passage just quoted. The first is from the initial cited paragraph: 
The exception [to the general rule that matters relating to labour 
relations lie within exclusive federal legislative authority] comprises, in 
the main, labour relations in undertakings, services and businesses 
which, having regard to the functional test of the nature of their 
operations and their normal activities, can be characterized as federal 
undertakings, services or businesses: ...95 
The second is this clause, which appears in the next-to-last quoted 
paragraph: “and assuming for the sake of argument that the functional 
test is not conclusive for the purposes of this case”.96 From these materi-
als, the majority concludes that the “functional test” for use in assigning 
labour relations jurisdiction is nothing more than the inquiry into whether 
the “operations and … normal activities” of the relevant enterprise “can 
be characterized as federal undertakings, services or businesses”. It is 
only if the results of the functional test, so understood, are inconclusive 
that one need go on to consider whether provincial regulation of the 
labour relations of the relevant employment enterprise would impair the 
core of a federal head of power such as section 91(24).97 “At no point,” 
the majority says:  
                                                                                                             
92  Four B Manufacturing Ltd. v. United Garment Workers of America, [1980] S.C.J. No. 
138, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1031, at 1045-47 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Four B”]. 
93  Id., at 1045. 
94  See NIL/TU,O, supra, note 90, at paras. 14-15, per Abella J. (for the majority), at para. 
54, per McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J. (concurring in the result). 
95  Four B, supra, note 92, at 1045. 
96  Id., at 1047. 
97  See NIL/TU,O, supra, note 90, at paras. 3, 4 (“The ‘core’ of whatever federal head of 
power happens to be at issue in a particular labour relations case has never been used by this Court 
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in discussing the functional test [in Four B], does Beetz J. mention the 
“core” of s. 91(24) or its content. In fact, he makes it clear that only if 
the functional test is inconclusive as to whether a particular undertaking 
is “federal”, should a court consider whether provincial regulation of 
labour relations would impair the “core” of whatever federal regulation 
governed the entity.98 
The concurring judges focus instead on this passage from the third to 
last paragraph of the text quoted from Four B:  
The functional test is a particular method of applying a more general 
rule namely, that exclusive federal jurisdiction over labour relations 
arises only if it can be shown that such jurisdiction forms an integral 
part of primary federal jurisdiction over some other federal object …99  
This proposition, they argue, establishes that the purpose of the func-
tional test is just to ascertain whether provincial regulation of the 
relevant employment enterprise would impair the core of any exclusively 
federal classes of subjects.100 Although they acknowledge that “Beetz J.’s 
reasons in another passage[101] suggest that the functional test might be a 
preliminary step to determining whether the activity forms an integral 
part of primary federal jurisdiction,” they point out, correctly,102 that 
“[i]n application, … Beetz J. went directly to a discussion of the scope of 
the ‘core of Indianness’ and whether the activity at issue fell within that 
core. He concluded that it did not.”103 
It is difficult to argue that either of these competing approaches, un-
derstood solely as an interpretation of this Delphic passage from Four B, 
is unreasonable or demonstrably preferable to the other. If asked, though, 
I would have said that the approach the concurring judges prescribed was 
                                                                                                             
to determine whether an entity is a ‘federal undertaking’ for the purposes of triggering the 
jurisdiction of the Canada Labour Code”) and paras. 12-20, per Abella J. (for the majority). 
98  Id., at para. 16. 
99  Four B, supra, note 92, at 1047. 
100  See NIL/TU,O, supra, note 90, at para. 58 (“Reading [the relevant earlier S.C.C. deci-
sions on the issue] together, we see no reason to depart from the view that the central question is 
whether the operation, viewed functionally in terms of its normal and habitual activities, falls within 
the core of a federal head of power, in this case s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867”), at para. 60 
(“The proper approach is simply to ask, as the cases consistently have, whether the Indian operation 
at issue, viewed functionally in terms of its normal and habitual activities, falls within the core of s. 
91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867”), and at para. 61 (“The functional analysis of the operation’s 
activities is not a preliminary step; rather it provides the answer to whether the activity falls within 
the protected core”), McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J. (concurring in the result). 
101  The passage quoted supra, note 96. 
102  See Four B, supra, note 92, at 1047-49. 
103  NIL/TU,O, supra, note 90, at para. 57, per McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J. (concurring in 
the result). 
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better, sounder constitutional law. I hold this view for two reasons. First 
and more important, it seems to me inconsistent with constitutional 
principle (especially in the wake of COPA104) for provincial labour 
relations regulation to be able to apply in a given situation despite 
impairing the core of one or more heads of exclusive federal authority.105 
And the only way of ensuring, in a case where the question arises, that 
provincial labour relations law does not impair the core of federal 
authority over something is to ask that question and answer it. Second, 
even if this were not the case, there is no obvious reason why constitu-
tional analysis of provincial labour relations laws should operate differ-
ently from constitutional analysis of other valid provincial legislation. 
But the most important practical difference for present purposes be-
tween the two approaches is this: the approach of the concurring judges 
required them to try to articulate the core of the “Indians” power in 
section 91(24);106 the approach of the majority did not.107 What we find 
in NIL/TU,O, therefore, is a proposal, offered by the three most senior 
judges of the Supreme Court of Canada,108 for further consideration 
when prescribing what is at the core of this head of power. Here it is: 
We may therefore conclude that the core, or “basic, minimum and 
unassailable content” of the federal power over “Indians” in s. 91(24) is 
defined as matters that go to the status and rights of Indians. Where 
their status and rights are concerned, Indians are federal “persons”, 
regulated by federal law: see Canadian Western Bank, at para. 60. 
It follows that a provincial law of general application will extend to 
Indian undertakings, businesses or enterprises, whether on or off a 
reserve, ex proprio vigore and by virtue of s. 88 of the Indian Act, 
R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5, except when the law impairs those functions of the 
enterprise which are intimately bound up with the status and rights of 
Indians. The cases illustrate matters that may go to the status and rights 
of Indians. These include, inter alia: 
                                                                                                             
104  Supra, note 24. 
105  Compare NIL/TU,O, supra, note 90, at para. 60, per McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J.: 
To exclude consideration of s. 91(24) would negate the federal power. Conversely, to 
deem any Aboriginal aspect sufficient to trigger federal jurisdiction would threaten to 
swallow the presumption that labour relations fall under provincial jurisdiction. 
106  “In these circumstances ... the first step is to determine the extent of the core federal 
undertaking or power”: id., at para. 61, per McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J. (concurring in the result). 
107  “Since in my view the functional test conclusively establishes that NIL/TU,O is a provin-
cial undertaking, I do not see this case as being the first to require an examination of the ‘core’ of s. 
91(24)”: id., at para. 4, per Abella J. (for the majority). 
108  McLachlin C.J.C., Binnie and Fish JJ. 
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• Indian status: Natural Parents v. Superintendent of Child Welfare, 
[1976] 2 S.C.R. 751, per Laskin C.J., writing for himself and three 
other Justices, at pp. 760-61, and per Beetz J., writing for himself 
and Pigeon J., at p. 787; 
• The “relationships within Indian families and reserve communities”: 
Canadian Western Bank, at para. 61; 
• “[R]ights so closely connected with Indian status that they should 
be regarded as necessary incidents of status such for instance as 
registrability, membership in a band, the right to participate in the 
election of Chiefs and Band Councils, reserve privileges, etc.”: 
Four B, at p. 1048; 
• The disposition of the matrimonial home on a reserve: Paul v. 
Paul, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 306; 
• The right to possession of lands on a reserve and, therefore, the 
division of family property on reserve lands: Derrickson v. 
Derrickson, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 285, at p. 296; 
• Sustenance hunting pursuant to Aboriginal and treaty rights, such 
as the killing of deer for food: Dick; 
• The right to advance a claim for the existence or extent of 
Aboriginal rights or title in respect of a contested resource or 
lands: Delgamuukw and Kitkatla Band v. British Columbia 
(Minister of Small Business, Tourism and Culture), 2002 SCC 31, 
[2002] 2 S.C.R. 146; and 
• The operation of constitutional and federal rules respecting 
Aboriginal rights: Paul v. British Columbia, among others. 
These examples make it clear that the focus of the analysis rests 
squarely on whether the nature of the operation and its normal 
activities, as distinguished from the people who are involved in running 
it or the cultural identity of those who may be affected by it, relate to 
what makes Indians federal persons as defined by what they do and 
what they are: Dick; Delgamuukw.109 
With respect, one can be grateful that paragraph 71 of NIL/TU,O did 
not command the support of a majority of the Court. If it had, it would 
have generated substantial doctrinal confusion. For several reasons, it 
would be imprudent to use it as trustworthy guidance to the core of 
section 91(24). 
                                                                                                             
109  NIL/TU,O, supra, note 90, at paras. 70-72 (emphasis in original). See id., at para. 66 for 
an earlier intimation that Indian “status and rights” are what comprise the core of s. 91(24). 
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Consider first the opening sentence: 
It follows that a provincial law of general application will extend to 
Indian undertakings, businesses or enterprises, whether on or off a 
reserve, ex proprio vigore and by virtue of s. 88 of the Indian Act, 
R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5, except when the law impairs those functions of the 
enterprise which are intimately bound up with the status and rights of 
Indians.110 
If Four B were one’s only frame of reference for the relevant law,111 one 
might be excused for saying such a thing. But we have known since 
Dick112 that no provincial legislation applies to Indians both ex proprio 
vigore and pursuant to section 88; these categories operate in the alterna-
tive to one another.113 Section 88, in fact, comes into play precisely 
when, and only when, a candidate provincial law “impairs those func-
tions of the enterprise which are intimately bound up with the status and 
rights of Indians”.114 Supreme Court decisions have reconfirmed these 
conclusions repeatedly in the interim.115 This sentence errs, therefore, in 
two respects: in supposing that section 88 operates on provincial laws 
that apply to Indians of their own force, and in supposing that it does not 
operate on provincial laws whose application would impair the core of 
Indianness. 
                                                                                                             
110  Id., at para. 71 (emphasis in original). 
111  See Four B, supra, note 92, at 1049:  
[W]hereas the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. I-6, regulates certain Indian civil rights such as 
the right to make a will and the distribution of property on intestacy, it does not provide 
for the regulation of the labour relations of Indians with one another or with non-Indians. 
... These labour relations accordingly remain subject to laws of general application in 
force in the Province as is contemplated by s. 88 of the Indian Act. 
112  Supra, note 41. 
113  See id., at 326-27:  
I believe that a distinction should be drawn between two categories of provincial laws. 
There are, on the one hand, provincial laws which can be applied to Indians without 
touching their Indianness ... ; there are on the other hand, provincial laws which cannot 
apply to Indians without regulating them qua Indians. 
Laws of the first category, in my opinion, continue to apply to Indians ex proprio 
vigore as they always did before the enactment of s. 88 in 1951 ... and quite apart from  
s. 88. ...  
I have come to the view that it is to the laws of the second category that s. 88 refers. 
114  See, supra, note 110, and accompanying text. 
115  See, e.g., Derrickson, supra, note 24, at 296-97; R. v. Francis, [1988] S.C.J. No. 43, 
[1988] 1 S.C.R. 1025, at 1028-29, 1030-31 (S.C.C.); Côté, supra, note 3, at para. 86; Delgamuukw, 
supra, note 4, at para. 182. But see R. v. Horseman, [1990] S.C.J. No. 39, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 901, at 
936 (S.C.C.) per Cory J. (for the majority), where the Court appeared to have overlooked the 
decision in Dick, supra, note 41, and the intervening jurisprudence. 
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Consider next the second bulleted candidate the concurring judges 
propose for inclusion in the core of section 91(24): “[t]he ‘relationships 
within Indian families and reserve communities: Canadian Western 
Bank, at para. 61.’”116 This is correct as far as it goes; Canadian Western 
Bank says this:  
Thus, in Natural Parents,[117] Laskin C.J. held the provincial 
Adoption Act to be inapplicable to Indian children on a reserve because 
to compel the surrender of Indian children to non-Indian parents 
“would be to touch ‘Indianness’, to strike at a relationship integral to a 
matter outside of provincial competence” (pp. 760-61).118  
This proposition poses no problem in its application to the facts of 
NIL/TU,O; NIL/TU,O, the society, possessed no powers of child protec-
tion at the time of the events that led to that litigation.119 But the powers 
of the children’s aid society at issue in Native Child120 did include 
“investigating allegations or evidence that children who are under the age 
of sixteen years … may be in need of protection; protecting [those 
children,] where necessary”; and “placing children for adoption”.121 On 
the different facts of Native Child, one might in these circumstances have 
expected at least some comment from the concurring judges on the 
exercise of this provincial authority.122  
The third bullet, a direct lift from Four B, gives no cause for doc-
trinal concern. The fourth and fifth, which deal with rights that pertain to 
reserve lands, are suitable examples of core federal matters, but including 
them in a list of core federal powers in relation to “Indians” overlooks 
the reminder, also from Four B, that “Section 91.24 of the [Constitution] 
Act, 1867 assigns jurisdiction to Parliament over two distinct subject 
matters, Indians and Lands reserved for the Indians, not Indians on 
                                                                                                             
116  NIL/TU,O, supra, note 90, at para. 71, per McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J. (concurring in 
the result). 
117  Natural Parents v. Superintendent of Child Welfare, [1975] S.C.J. No. 101, [1976] 2 
S.C.R. 751 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Natural Parents”]. 
118  Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 24, at para. 61. 
119  See NIL/TU,O, supra, note 90, especially at paras. 29-30, per Abella J. (for the majority). 
120  Supra, note 91. 
121  Id., at para. 7, per Abella J. (for the majority). 
122  Instead, they said only that they concurred with the majority, but “on the basis of the 
approach outlined in our reasons in NIL/TU,O”: id., at para. 13. Consider here the merits of this 
observation from the NIL/TU,O majority: “the question is not whether the entity’s operations lie at 
the ‘core’ of the federal head of power; it is whether the provincial regulation of that entity’s labour 
relations would impair the ‘core’ of that head of power”: NIL/TU,O, supra, note 90, at para. 20, per 
Abella J. (emphasis in original). 
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Lands reserved for the Indians.”123 These propositions relate more 
properly to the core of the “Lands reserved” power. 
It is the last three items in the concurring judges’ list from NIL/TU,O 
that create the greatest potential for further constitutional confusion, both 
for what they say and for what they do not say. It is true, for example, 
that “Sustenance hunting pursuant to Aboriginal and treaty rights, such as 
the killing of deer for food”124 has been placed at the core of federal 
authority over “Indians”,125 but the Dick decision126 does nothing to 
substantiate the point. It is not a treaty case;127 it involves no assertion of 
Aboriginal rights;128 and the court expressly did not decide, but assumed 
without deciding, that the relevant provincial law could not apply as such 
to the hunting activity for which Mr. Dick was accused.129 (And why did 
the court make no mention of Morris?)130 It is also true, however, that 
this proposition understates, without explanation, the role of treaty and 
Aboriginal rights in the core of exclusive federal authority under section 
91(24). Earlier Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence had held, as 
mentioned above, that the core of the “Indians” power houses both 
Aboriginal and treaty rights per se, not just those that pertain to suste-
nance hunting.131 
As for “[t]he right to advance a claim for the existence or extent of 
Aboriginal rights or title in respect of a contested resource or lands,”132 
one would have expected, other things equal, such a right to lie within 
the range of provincial authority over “Procedure in Civil Matters” in the 
courts of a province.133 We know from Paul134 that the provinces have 
full constitutional capacity to authorize their administrative tribunals to 
                                                                                                             
123  Four B, supra, note 92, at 1049-50 (emphasis in original). Compare Delgamuukw, supra, 
note 4, at para. 178 (Aboriginal “rights in relation to land ... derive from s. 91(24)’s reference to 
‘Lands reserved for the Indians’”); and generally, id., at paras. 174-178 (dealing separately with 
federal legislative authority over “Lands reserved for the Indians” and over “Indians”). 
124  NIL/TU,O, supra, note 90, at para. 71, quoted in text, supra, at note 109. 
125  See, as regards subsistence treaty rights to hunt, Morris, supra, note 21, at para. 43, per 
Deschamps and Abella JJ. (for the majority), and at paras. 91, 100, per McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J. 
(dissenting on other grounds). 
126  Supra, note 41. 
127  Id., at 312 (appellant “is a non-treaty Indian”), citing R. v. Dick, [1982] B.C.J. No. 2191, 
3 C.C.C. (3d) 481, at 484 (B.C.C.A.), per Lambert J.A. (dissenting on other grounds). 
128  See R. v. Dick, id., at 315 (“One issue that does not arise is that of Aboriginal Title or 
Rights”). 
129  See id., at 320-21. 
130  Supra, note 21. 
131  See supra, notes 17-21 and accompanying text. 
132  NIL/TU,O, supra, note 90, at para. 71, quoted in text supra, at note 109. 
133  Constitution Act, 1867, s. 92(14). 
134  Supra, note 3. 
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hear and determine claims of Aboriginal right brought before them in 
otherwise proper proceedings135 and to deprive their tribunals of that 
jurisdiction, either explicitly or by withholding from them power to 
decide questions of law. (Provincially constituted courts appear to stand 
in the same position.) This acknowledged provincial constitutional 
authority seems indistinguishable from authority over “[t]he right to 
advance a claim for the existence or extent of Aboriginal rights or 
title.”136 And neither Delgamuukw137 nor Kitkatla,138 the two decisions on 
which the concurring judges in NIL/TU,O rely for this proposition, 
speaks thematically to the issue. In Kitkatla, no such question arose: the 
appellant First Nation had abandoned any claim of Aboriginal right or 
title by the time the case reached the Court.139 Delgamuukw did conclude 
that the appellants’ claims of Aboriginal rights and title were not properly 
before the Court,140 but it did so because of defects in the pleadings not 
corrected by formal amendment. There was no suggestion that British 
Columbia lacked authority to regulate the procedure for Aboriginal rights 
or title claims prosecution through the courts. 
Finally, the concurring judges say that “[t]he operation of constitu-
tional and federal rules respecting Aboriginal rights” lies within the core 
of exclusive federal authority over “Indians”. The reference here to 
“federal rules respecting Aboriginal rights”, once properly understood,141 
                                                                                                             
135  See id., at paras. 21-23, 34. 
136  See id., at para. 21; Ontario (Attorney General) v. Pembina Exploration Canada Ltd., 
[1989] S.C.J. No. 9, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 206 (S.C.C.). 
137  Supra, note 4. 
138  Supra, note 22. 
139  Id., at para. 47. 
140  Delgamuukw, supra, note 4, at paras. 73-77. 
141  In the absence of some relevant context or history, there would be good reason to doubt 
that all federal rules about something federal — about Aboriginal rights, for example — lay within 
exclusive federal legislative authority. Not all federal measures validly enacted engage the core of 
some head of exclusive federal power: see, e.g., General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National 
Leasing, [1989] S.C.J. No. 28, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641 (S.C.C.). In this instance, however, there is 
relevant context and history. In Ordon Estate v. Grail, [1998] S.C.J. No. 84, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ordon Estate”], the Court held (at para. 68) that “Canadian maritime law is a 
body of federal law [Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91(10)], uniform across the country, within which 
there is no room for the application of provincial statutes” and (at para. 85) that “it is constitutionally 
impermissible for the application of a provincial statute to have the effect of supplementing existing 
federal rules of maritime negligence law in such a manner that the provincial law effectively alters 
rules within the exclusive competence of Parliament or the courts to alter.” In Paul, supra, note 3, 
the Court, relying on Ordon Estate (see, e.g., para. 15), held (at para. 19) that “[l]egislation that 
triggers the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity purports to … alter rights and obligations. Such 
inapplicable legislation may purport to ‘supplement’ existing federal rules,” but, id., that the 
statutory grant of adjudicative jurisdiction to the British Columbia Forest Appeals Commission was 
constitutionally permissible because it did “not attempt to supplement or amend the constitutional 
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seems defensible, but one would have expected neither order of govern-
ment to have any constitutional authority, let alone exclusive authority, 
unilaterally to provide for, alter or abolish constitutional rules, or their 
operation, respecting Aboriginal rights.142 
One relevant lesson from NIL/TU,O, therefore, appears to be that the 
Court is unsure of its ground when it comes to provincial authority and 
Aboriginal peoples, and perhaps when it comes to provincial authority 
and interjurisdictional immunity. We will never know (or at least not in 
time for the knowledge to help doctrinally), but it is, at the very least, 
possible that the majority in NIL/TU,O took such pains to decouple the 
functional test used in labour relations cases from the more generic 
doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity in order not to have to concern 
itself with the core of section 91(24) or to comment on the concurring 
judges’ proposal in respect of that issue. 
IV. NOTES TOWARD A CONVERSATION 
At the close of 2010, therefore, we find ourselves, for present pur-
poses, more or less where we were just before the Canadian Western 
Bank decision: with an interjurisdictional immunity doctrine that has 
refused to die and that continues to frustrate attempts to find a credible 
constitutional source for provincial power to infringe/impair, even when 
justified, existing treaty or Aboriginal rights. We are fated, a little longer 
at least, to dwell within a constitutional order that, to this extent, remains 
at war with itself. 
I repeat that I have no ready solution. But one possible way of mak-
ing progress when confronted with unacknowledged conflict between 
                                                                                                             
and federal rules respecting aboriginal rights”. The analogy from Ordon Estate on which the court 
relies in Paul holds only if Canadian Aboriginal rights law, like Canadian maritime law, “is a body 
of federal law, uniform across the country, within which there is no room for the application of 
provincial statutes”. This conclusion would likely make more practical difference than it currently 
does if there were more of a body of federal law that deals with Aboriginal rights. To the best of my 
knowledge, there is, at present, no federal statute law that is expressly about Aboriginal rights. We 
do know, however, that the law of Aboriginal title is, by its nature, federal common law: see Roberts 
v. Canada, [1989] 1 S.C.R 322 (S.C.C.). 
142  See, e.g., Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [1951] S.C.J. 
No. 32, [1951] S.C.R. 31 (S.C.C.) (neither order of government may transfer or delegate legislative 
authority to the other); McEvoy v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1983] S.C.J. No. 51, [1983] 
1 S.C.R. 704 (S.C.C.) (even acting in concert, provincial and federal legislatures cannot alter the 
judicature scheme, including the guarantees of judicial independence, set out in ss. 96-101 of the 
Constitution Act, 1867); R. v. Dick, supra, note 41, at 327-28 (Parliament may not prescribe 
unilaterally when its legislation renders provincial legislation inoperative). 
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contrary strands of doctrine is to explore the normative question that 
underlies the conflict. In this instance, the normative question concerns 
the kind of relationship that ought to subsist between provincial govern-
ments and Aboriginal communities bearing section 35 rights. One way of 
sharpening our intuitions for such a discussion is to consider what it 
would mean operationally if the courts were prepared, in the interest of 
jurisprudential consistency, to allow the doctrine of interjurisdictional 
immunity to have its effect, depriving provinces altogether143 of inde-
pendent authority to impair existing treaty or Aboriginal rights. Would 
such an outcome simply be constitutionally intolerable? 
For purposes of the present discussion, I am going to make two as-
sumptions. The first is that such an outcome, rightly or wrongly, would 
frighten much of mainstream Canada, including many governments and 
judges. My second assumption is that it would be unfair and inappropri-
ate for our courts, on this account alone, to withhold accreditation from 
otherwise eligible claims of treaty or Aboriginal right. What options exist 
for managing relationships somewhat harmoniously in a setting that 
features both of these assumptions? 
A sensible place to begin is by remembering that such a setting need 
not leave existing treaty or Aboriginal rights entirely unregulated. 
“Federal legislative powers continue, including, of course, the right to 
legislate with respect to Indians pursuant to s. 91(24) of the Constitution 
Act, 1867.”144 We know, as well, that there are ways of involving provin-
cial governments in the design and administration of regulatory regimes 
that govern core federal matters. Federal fisheries regulation in Ontario is 
an illustrative example. The Fisheries Act145 authorizes regulations 
implementing the legislation; Canada has chosen to enact regulations 
specific to individual provinces or regions. To the best of my knowledge, 
the government of Ontario is, at a minimum, heavily involved in helping 
design the Ontario Fishery Regulations, 2007 from time to time;146 those 
regulations, in turn, repose considerable discretion in the Ontario 
Minister of Natural Resources and its officials in regard to the implemen-
tation, administration and enforcement of the federal scheme. In Peralta, 
                                                                                                             
143  Apart from those whose “laws respecting game” operate despite ordinary division of 
powers principles, pursuant to the Natural Resources Transfer Agreements and the Constitution Act, 
1930. See discussion, supra, at note 4. 
144  Sparrow, supra, note 4, at 1109. 
145  R.S.C. 1970, c. F-14; now R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14. 
146  Currently SOR/2007-237. 
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the Ontario Court of Appeal147 and the Supreme Court of Canada148 each 
affirmed unanimously the constitutional legitimacy of this arrangement. 
Such arrangements, of course, depend for their effectiveness on political 
will, considerable intergovernmental cooperation and careful legislative 
and regulatory drafting; in other words, on voluntary embrace of the 
principles of flexible, cooperative federalism. But where such conditions 
obtain, there appears to be no constitutional impediment to extensive 
provincial involvement, under federal auspices, in the development, 
implementation and enforcement of regulations governing the exercise of 
section 35 rights, always assuming that the regulatory arrangements 
themselves meet the Supreme Court’s tests for justification of measures 
or conduct that infringes such rights.149 
But whether or not the federal order elects to use its unquestioned 
power to regulate the exercise of section 35 rights, and whether or not, in 
doing so, it elects to involve the provinces in the design and enforcement 
of any such scheme, the courts already have means, if they choose to use 
them, by which to police the constitutionally protected scope of such 
rights. Consider the implications of two defining features of treaty and 
Aboriginal rights: that they are communal in character; and that they 
derive — explicitly in the case of Aboriginal rights;150 indirectly in the 
case of treaty rights framed to preserve “usual” or “former” “habits”, 
“vocations” or “avocations” — from ascertainable customs, traditions 
and practices deemed to be of integral significance to the ways of life of 
particular right-bearing communities. 
It is now well established that both treaty rights151 and Aboriginal 
rights152 are, by nature, communal and are available to individuals for 
exercise only by virtue of their membership in right-bearing communities 
or, exceptionally, with the prior permission of an Aboriginal community 
                                                                                                             
147  Peralta v. Ontario, [1985] O.J. No. 2304, 49 O.R. (2d) 705 (Ont. C.A.), affd [1988] 
S.C.J. No. 92, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1045 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Peralta”].  
148  [1988] S.C.J. No. 92, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1045 (S.C.C.). 
149  For the justification requirements for infringements of treaty rights and various kinds of 
Aboriginal rights, see Sparrow, supra, note 4, at 1108-11, 1113-19; Badger, supra, note 4, at paras. 82-
85, 96-99; Gladstone, supra, note 29, at paras. 54-84; Delgamuukw, supra, note 4, at paras. 161-169. 
150  See, e.g., R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] S.C.J. No. 77, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, at paras. 44, 46 
(S.C.C.). 
151  R. v. Marshall, [1999] S.C.J. No. 66, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533, at para. 17 (S.C.C.) [hereinaf-
ter “Marshall II”], R. v. Shipman, [2007] O.J. No. 1716, 2007 ONCA 338, 85 O.R. (3d) 585, at 
paras. 43, 50 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Shipman”]. 
152  For Métis Aboriginal rights, see R. v. Powley, [2003] S.C.J. No. 43, 2003 SCC 43, [2003] 
2 S.C.R. 207, at para. 44 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Powley”]; for other Aboriginal rights, see Sappier, 
supra, note 6, at para. 26; R. v. Kapp, [2008] S.C.J. No. 42, 2008 SCC 41, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483, at 
para. 4 (S.C.C.). 
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other than one’s own, to which the right belongs.153 Delgamuukw154 
confirms that some such rights, at least, embody and protect a sphere of 
collective decision-making in respect of the subject matter of the right.155 
It is sensible to suppose that such collective decision-making typically 
manifests generically through contemporary interpretation and applica-
tion of the customs, traditions and practices normative within a given 
community. Such customs, traditions and practices, therefore, can be said 
to prescribe the default conditions governing permissible participation in 
communal treaty or Aboriginal rights.  
Jurisprudence from other Commonwealth countries has accepted this 
proposition explicitly. A body of New Zealand jurisprudence, for exam-
ple, has emphasized that “the exercise of rights to fish” in traditional 
Maori communities “was circumscribed by well established criteria”: 
[that] the gathering of fish, although a well developed process and 
conditioned by centuries of experience and accumulated knowledge, 
was accompanied by rules emanating from tribal authority and 
practices and customs and no doubt adapted as the years went by to 
environment and requirements through time.156  
A more recent judgment of the High Court of Australia has this to say 
about the “privilege” of individual exercise of a communal native 
customary right:  
[S]uch a finding [viz., that a community has a right to hunt estuarine 
crocodiles on its traditional lands] will not necessarily dispose of the 
question of whether a particular individual or sub-group within that 
community has the privilege to hunt estuarine crocodiles. The nature 
and scope of the privileges in question will vary with the traditional 
laws and customs of the particular community so as to accord with the 
                                                                                                             
153  See, e.g., Shipman, supra, note 151; R. v. Meshake, [2007] O.J. No. 1714, 2007 ONCA 
337, 85 O.R. (3d) 575 (Ont. C.A.). 
154  Supra, note 4. 
155  See id., at paras. 115, 166, 168 (decisions with respect to Aboriginal title land are made 
by the title-holding community). At para. 168, the Court says that the “aboriginal right to fish for 
food, by contrast, does not contain within it the same discretionary component”. If what the Court 
means is that a right to fish for food cannot, as such, authorize a community to harvest fish for uses 
other than food, one can hardly disagree. Given the context in which the issue arose in Delgamuukw, 
id., it seems unnecessary to suppose that the Court meant anything more by this observation. 
156  See, e.g., R. v. Campbell, [1989] D.C.R. 254, at 271 and 269 (N.Z. Dist. Ct.). Compare, 
e.g., Te Weehi v. Regional Fisheries Officer, [1986] 1 N.Z.L.R. 680, at 682-83, 692-93 (H.C.). 
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distinct social structure and patterns of occupancy and use of the land 
of that indigenous community.157  
Closer to home, the Ontario Court of Appeal has already held that “[i]n 
Aboriginal custom, protection and conservation of harvesting resources 
is paramount” and that “[a]ny departure from this aspect of Aboriginal 
custom would probably negative any consent” that an outsider from a 
different Aboriginal community might receive to share in the exercise of 
the home community’s treaty or Aboriginal harvesting rights.158 
These doctrinal foundations equip Canadian courts to hold, if they 
choose, that no individual may invoke the protection of an existing treaty 
or Aboriginal right for particular conduct unless he or she can show that 
the relevant conduct either: (1) conforms with the norms and principles 
internal to the right-bearing community that inform and define the 
relevant right; or (2) has the approval — the prior approval, Shipman 
suggests159 — of the governing authorities of the community to which 
the right belongs in the relevant geographic area. Such an approach 
would have at least two salutary consequences. On the one hand, it 
would afford a check against the frolics of rogue members of right-
bearing Aboriginal communities by requiring, as a prerequisite for 
constitutional protection of the conduct impugned, that the community 
itself acknowledge some responsibility for community members160 and 
for their conduct. On the other hand, it would require the mainstream 
legal order to accept that certain rights it explicitly recognizes and 
                                                                                                             
157  Yanner v. Eaton, [1999] HCA 53, 201 C.L.R. 351, at para. 74, per Gummow J. (concur-
ring). 
158  Shipman, supra, note 151, at para. 45. See also id., at para. 51. 
159  Shipman, id., at para. 50:  
First, as I said, treaty rights are communal; any consent that may be granted must reflect 
respect for the community of treaty rights holders, which means that any consent granted 
to share the harvesting resource must weigh and consider the communal interest. In order 
to properly do this, the person capable of granting the consent would normally require the 
request in advance. 
See generally id., at paras. 49-53. 
160  We know from Powley, supra, note 152, that “accept[ance] by the modern community … 
an objective demonstration of a solid bond of past and present mutual identification and recognition 
of common belonging between the claimant and other members of the rights-bearing community” is 
a condition precedent for eligibility to exercise the Aboriginal rights of a Métis community: id., at 
para. 33 (emphasis in original). Although, to the best of my knowledge, the courts have not yet 
addressed the issue, it is reasonable to suppose that a comparable prerequisite governs individuals’ 
eligibility to exercise the s. 35 rights of Indian or Inuit communities. 
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affirms entail, and in this respect depend upon, a dimension of Aboriginal 
self-government.161 
But limits that flow from communities’ own understandings and 
ways of ordering integral shared activities are not the only available tools 
for judicial constraint on the constitutionally protected scope of section 
35 rights. Recall the well-known proposition that treaty rights to hunt do 
not protect the right to hunt unsafely. In Morris,162 for instance, the 
majority said that “it could not have been within the common intention of 
the parties [to the 1850 Douglas Treaties] that the Tsartlip would be 
granted a right to hunt dangerously, since no treaty confers on its benefi-
ciaries a right to put human lives in danger”.163 This conclusion derived 
neither from close textual analysis of the Douglas Treaties, nor from 
research into the negotiations that led to those treaties; it derived from a 
shared sense that such a treaty right simply would not do in Canadian 
law: that the Crown, acting rationally, could never agree to such a thing. 
The same is true in each of the other decisions I have found that deemed 
safety to be an internal limit on the permissible exercise of treaty rights 
to hunt.164 In essence, these decisions appear to be saying, though in 
different words, that it would be contrary to public policy to extend 
constitutional protection to unsafe activity. 
Consider now Myran,165 the first Supreme Court decision that, to my 
knowledge, dealt with public safety and the hunting rights of Aboriginal 
peoples. At issue there was not a hunting right set out in a treaty, but the 
hunting right prescribed and preserved in paragraph 13 of the Manitoba 
                                                                                                             
161  This is not the place to discuss in detail possible constitutional rights of self-government. 
Suffice it for present purposes to note that the Supreme Court of Canada appears to have left at least 
slightly ajar the door to eventual accreditation of self-government rights (see R. v. Pamajewon, 
[1996] S.C.J. No. 20, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 821, at paras. 24-25 (S.C.C.); Delgamuukw, supra, note 4, at 
paras. 170-171) and the British Columbia Supreme Court has upheld the validity of the Nisga’a 
Treaty in part because it preserves and codifies pre-existing self-government rights that the Nisga’a 
already had: see Campbell v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2000] B.C.J. No. 1524, 189 
D.L.R. (4th) 333 (B.C.S.C.). 
162  Supra, note 21. 
163  Id., at para. 35, per Deschamps and Abella JJ. (for the majority). Compare id., at para. 
110, per McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J. (dissenting on other grounds). 
164  See, e.g., Simon, supra, note 21, at 403 (“it is implicit in the right granted under article 4 
of the Treaty of 1752 that the appellant has the right to possess a gun and ammunition in a safe 
manner in order to be able to exercise the right to hunt”); R. v. Paul and Paul, [1987] N.B.J. No. 
194, 80 N.B.R. (2d) 1, at para. 28 (N.B.Q.B.) (relying on Simon, id.); R. v. Napoleon, [1985] B.C.J. 
No. 2070, [1985] 6 W.W.R. 302, at 310 (B.C.C.A.) (“It is implicit in Treaty Number 8 that the 
obligation to hunt safely applies throughout the areas where hunting is permitted by the treaty”);  
R. v. McCoy, [1993] N.B.J. No. 597, 109 D.L.R. (4th) 433, at 437-38 (N.B.C.A.) (relying on Simon, 
id., and R. v. Paul and Paul, id.). 
165  Myran v. R., [1975] S.C.J. No. 69, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 137 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Myran”]. 
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Natural Resources Transfer Agreement,166 a constitutional instrument. 
Dismissing an appeal from conviction on provincial unsafe hunting 
charges, the Court concluded that there is “no irreconcilable conflict” 
between the right and the statutory requirement “that such right be 
exercised in a manner so as not to endanger the lives of others”.167 
“Inherent in the right,” the Court said, quoting with approval from the 
judgment in the court below, “is the quality of restraint, that is to say that 
the right will be exercised reasonably.”168  
This principle — that “the quality of restraint” inheres in the consti-
tutional rights of Aboriginal peoples — is susceptible to generalization 
beyond issues of safety and rights to hunt. It could give the courts 
permission to read down existing treaty or Aboriginal rights where 
necessary to construe them “in a manner consistent with the fundamental 
values enshrined in the Constitution”.169 (Such a course would be quite 
consistent with the rule in English law that “a custom to be valid must be 
such that, in the opinion of a trained lawyer, it is consistent, or, at any 
rate, not inconsistent, with those general principles which, quite apart 
from particular rules or maxims, lie at the root of our legal system.”)170 
Further work, of course, would be needed to identify any relevant 
“fundamental values” and to determine when it is apposite for the courts 
to invoke them. Species and habitat conservation might, however, 
deserve at least some consideration as possible reasons to invoke “the 
quality of restraint”.171 
                                                                                                             
166  Schedule 1 to the Constitution Act, 1930. 
167  Myran, supra, note 165, at 142. 
168  Id. Special thanks to Kristina Gill for calling this to my attention. 
169  Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., 
[1986] S.C.J. No. 75, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, at 603 (S.C.C.); R. v. Salituro, [1991] S.C.J. No. 97, 
[1991] 3 S.C.R. 654, at 675 (S.C.C.). 
170  Johnson v. Clark, [1908] 1 Ch. 303, at 311. 
171  Space does not permit a thorough discussion of this suggestion here. Suffice it for now to 
say that argument supporting it would have to be crafted with care. In R. v. Kruger, [1978] S.C.J. 
No. 43, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 104 (S.C.C.), the Supreme Court expressed some displeasure at the prospect 
that a province might “act … in such a way as to oppose conservation and Indian claims to the 
detriment of the latter”. And on at least two more recent occasions in — Simon, supra, note 21, at 
413, and in Badger, supra, note 4, at paras. 90-94, the Court has held that particular provincial 
measures acknowledged to have been enacted for conservation purposes can and do conflict with, 
infringe, existing treaty rights to hunt. From this, it follows that conservation as defined by the 
province is not, as such, an internal limit on the reach of these rights. There may still be room to 
argue, however, that “reasonable” exercise of such rights does not include conduct inconsistent with 
basic conservation imperatives as defined by the courts, independent of provincial conservation 
policy. Certain forms and concentrations of harvesting activity, in other words, might be perceived 
to be so clearly unacceptable that no treaty or Aboriginal right cognizable in Canadian law could be 
deemed to countenance them.  
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The significance for present purposes of both kinds of internal limits 
on treaty or Aboriginal rights — those that derive from a community’s 
own understanding of its customs and those that derive from judicial 
intuitions about public policy — is that they would render certain kinds 
of unwelcome conduct subject to relevant provincial law, even if the 
perpetrator belonged to a right-bearing Aboriginal community and even 
if the provinces have no capacity to impair section 35 rights or their 
exercise. “Valid provincial laws that fall outside the scope of the treaty 
[or Aboriginal] right, by virtue of an internal limit on the treaty [or 
Aboriginal] right, do not go to ‘core Indianness’ and thus apply ex 
proprio vigore.”172 
The preceding discussion appears to suggest that the sky need not 
fall if the provinces turn out not to have independent constitutional 
authority to impair existing treaty or Aboriginal rights or their exercise. 
There are several ways, alone or in combination, in which the Canadian 
constitutional order might, even then, accommodate such rights respon-
sibly. It need not find ways, on that account, of screening out all but the 
most innocuous candidates. 
I do not pretend that this settles the issue. At most, it offers some op-
tions for going on within a constitutional order that continues to feature 
interjurisdictional immunity and is not able to conjure any doctrinally 
stable explanation for exempting treaty or Aboriginal rights from the 
application of that principle. My hope is that they offer material for the 
normative conversation I believe we need to have about the kind of 
relationship that ought to exist in Canadian law between provinces and 
right-bearing Aboriginal communities.173 
We all have a stake in resolution of the current doctrinal impasse 
over provincial capacity to infringe section 35 rights. There are times, as 
                                                                                                             
172  Morris, supra, note 21, at para. 100, per McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J. (dissenting on 
other grounds). Compare R. v. Marshall, [1999] S.C.J. No. 55, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456, at para. 61 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Marshall I”], Marshall II, supra, note 151, at paras. 36-39. 
173  If those options seem unpalatable, a final additional option — amending the Constitution 
itself — may warrant at least some attention. If Kitkatla, supra, note 22, and Morris, supra, note 21, 
are any indication of the federal position, this is an instance in which provincial and federal interests 
would align; both would favour ensuring provincial capacity, subject to justification, to constrain  
s. 35 rights to the point of infringement. (In both appeals, Canada supported the province’s claims of 
authority: see Kitkatla, id., at para. 72; Factum of the Intervener the Attorney General of Canada, 
Ivan Morris and Carl Olsen v. Her Majesty the Queen (August 3, 2005), at para. 45.) Any such 
proposal would require a prior constitutional conference involving first ministers and “representa-
tives of the aboriginal peoples of Canada”: Constitution Act, 1982, s. 35.1, added by the Constitu-
tional Amendment Proclamation, 1983, SI/84-102. But in the present circumstances, such a 
conference hardly seems a bad thing, with or without the prospect of a constitutional amendment. 
This is an issue that deserves, and appears to require, cooperative collective deliberation. 
562 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
St. Paul174 and Justice Binnie175 have each acknowledged, when we have 
no choice except to see things “as through a glass, darkly”, but this, with 
great respect, is not one of them. And this may well be one of the 
surprisingly frequent occasions in law when having an answer is more 
important than what the answer is.  
                                                                                                             
174  I Corinthians 13:12. 
175  Marshall I, supra, note 172, at para. 3.  
